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Abstract 
In contrast to most countries with affirmative action policies, Malaysia and South Africa have 
both established policies whose intended beneficiaries make up the majority of their respective 
populations. Despite their many social and historical similarities, the rationales employed by 
both states to justify their affirmative action policies turned out to be extremely different: 
Malaysia's justifications were “retributive” in nature, whereas South Africa's justifications were 
“restitutive.” This comparative-and-historical paper seeks not only to determine the factors that 
caused these different outcomes, but also to provide an alternate perspective to existing 
scholarship on affirmative action policies, most of which focus on minority-beneficiary nations. I 
argue that the variations in outcomes can be traced back to their respective transitions to 
independence, which set in motion historical processes resulting in two fundamentally different 
societies in terms of how political and economic power were initially distributed and how it 
transformed to their present-day outcomes. 
 
 1
 Malaysia and South Africa share characteristics. Both countries are former colonies of 
the United Kingdom. Both have societies that have been organized along racial and ethnic lines, 
which persist to this day. In the same vein, both countries are also similar in that political and 
economic power has not been concentrated among a single dominant ethnic group. Rather, the 
largest ethnic group of both nations’ populations (those considered ‘natives’ at the time of 
colonization) wields political power, while economic power is concentrated among members of 
an ethnic – and immigrant – minority. Most importantly from a public policy standpoint and the 
focus of this paper, both nations have established affirmative action policies whose intended 
beneficiaries make up the majority of their respective populations. Both nations’ affirmative 
action policies seek to address the same problem: to redistribute wealth from their respective 
minority economic elites to members of the less prosperous majority ethnic group. 
 Before going any further, it is necessary to provide a single definition of “affirmative 
action” for the purposes of this paper. Adam (1997: 1) writes: “Affirmative action … can be 
understood as a remedial strategy which seeks to address the legal historical exclusion of a 
majority.” It is important to note that this definition is true only in the context of this paper, since 
the affirmative action policies of most other countries that employ them benefit a previously-
disenfranchised minority, not a majority group. This distinction serves as an indicator that 
different processes are at play. Generally speaking, affirmative action policies in majority-
beneficiary democratic nations (e.g. Malaysia, South Africa) strongly suggest some degree of 
political pressure from the electorate. In contrast, the same case cannot be made for minority-
beneficiary nations (e.g. the United States, Australia), as segments of the political electorate 
majority would be opposed to giving up any advantages, perceived or not, they have gained from 
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historical inequalities. This strongly suggests that minority-beneficiary affirmative action 
policies stem from other pressures, such as international pressure and human rights discourse. 
 Despite these striking similarities, there is one glaring difference. Malaysia’s ethnic 
groups coexisted relatively peacefully prior to independence, whereas South Africa had a very 
well-known history of institutionalized racial discrimination under apartheid. Specifically 
because the oppressed majority groups in both democratic countries make up the beneficiaries of 
these affirmative action policies, conventional wisdom suggests that the country with peaceful 
race relations (Malaysia) would be more likely to adopt “restitutive” policies; whereas the 
country (South Africa) with turbulent race relations would more likely have harsher, 
“retributive” policies. Retributive affirmative action policies are policies which incorporate 
measures which assign blame to and therefore actively place restrictions on members of a 
specific group or groups. In contrast, restitutive rationales seek consensus and therefore do not 
seek to assign blame nor bestow benefits on members of any specific group. Rather, restitutive 
rationales acknowledge the broad inequalities which exist within a society and propose measures 
framed in the language of inclusiveness. Theoretically, the benefits of restitutive policies could 
be enjoyed by all members of society, rather than just the members of a particular group. 
Affirmative action policies in the two countries did not turn out as predicted, however. 
Policymakers in both countries advanced very distinct rationales to justify the implementation of 
affirmative action policies in the two countries. These differences in rationales inform and 
explain the specific measures that are incorporated into the policies. The rationale for Malaysia’s 
New Economic Policy (NEP) is one I would consider to be of a retributive nature, while South 
Africa’s Employment Equity Act (EEA) is more restitutive. What accounts for the disjuncture 
between the history of inter-group relations and the nature and rationale of policies to redress 
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inequalities? I will broadly address this in the theoretical overview, focusing specifically on 
debates surrounding racial/ethnic group formation and identity. 
More specifically, in order to understand why these affirmative action policies came to be 
the way they are, one has to first understand the origins of their underlying causes. This leads to 
the research question that informs the core of this paper: what was responsible for Malaysia’s 
peaceful racial coexistence and South Africa’s violent repression of their various ethnic groups, 
and how did this affect the affirmative action policies that both countries eventually adopted? I 
will argue that despite their many similarities, Malaysia’s and South Africa’s differences in 
affirmative action policies can be traced back to the circumstances surrounding each country’s 
respective transition to independence, as this transition to independence essentially set in motion 
the historical processes responsible for the two nations’ different policies. These processes, 
which can be broadly summarized as both nations’ legacies of ethnic relations, include their 
respective bases of franchise, the distribution of economic opportunities in their two societies, 
dominant perceptions of the economically-dominant group, the role of international pressure in 
influencing domestic policies, and their present-day political organizations. 
 
Theoretical Overview 
 Racial/ethnic group formation has long been a core concept in political sociology. After 
all, there have historically been few ethnically-homogenous nations, and even then it was 
impossible for them to avoid coming into contact with outsiders who spoke different languages, 
adhered to different religions, and followed different cultures. Hence, the division of societies 
among ethnic lines is a very commonly-observed phenomenon, as the following theoretical 
overview will illustrate. Since both Malaysia and South Africa are states with multiethnic 
populations, it is important to see how these theories apply to their specific cases. 
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Colonial Strategies as Processes of State Formation 
 The origins of affirmative action policies are directly tied to processes of state formation, 
as state formation is directly responsible for the creation and transformation of social groups – 
and by extension, societal divides (Larson and Zalanga 2003). Closely related to the origins of 
societal divides is the subject of identity formation, particularly as it relates to issues such as 
citizenship (Brubaker 1998). In the cases of Malaysia and South Africa, the primary divides that 
their affirmative action policies seek to remedy is political and economic inequalities resulting 
from their respective history of race and ethnic relations.  
 Since South Africa and Malaysia were both former colonies of the same colonial master, 
Great Britain, what factors could account for the extremely different societal structures and 
policies which emerged? I argue that differences in colonial strategies are important not only for 
the societal structures (and divides) that they create, but also because they shape social and 
political identities. Go (2007) offers the concept of “provinciality:” policies of governance have 
been different because of “the distinct characteristics of those whom empire aimed to rule” (77). 
It is in the interest of the colonizer “to cultivate consent and compliance” (Go 2007: 99) 
wherever possible because, from a political and economic perspective, coercion of an oppressed 
people is costly both economically and politically (Ikenberry 2001). This resulted in regimes that 
“ultimately went native, shaping themselves to local conditions and incorporating what they 
found there” (Go 2007: 99). Although the examples that Go provides were not settler colonies, 
we will see later that the Afrikaner settlements that were established prior to the arrival of the 
British were a very real “local condition” that the British colonizers had to deal with as they tried 
to consolidate their power. From a different perspective, Steinmetz has claimed that policy 
formation can be influenced by factors such as “geopolitical and economic interests [and the] 
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responses by the colonized” (Steinmetz 2008: 589). An example of this would be the reason the 
British prevented native Malays from tin mining: not only the British had an interest in 
minimizing competition for the valued resource; the rulers of the native Malays were mainly 
cooperative with the British, being largely content with their arrangement with the British to 
retain some authority over their subjects and domains. This reinforced the perception that 
specific ethnic groups were assigned specific roles within Malay society; perceptions that could 
not easily be broken. Tin mining became perceived as being immigrants’ jobs; while subsistence 
farming remained the domain of the Malays. 
 By extension, the effects of the identities created by these colonial strategies influence 
other elements of society such as markets and other institutions of economic activity. Based on 
this premise, Larson and Zalanga (2003: 76) claim that “[s]uch economic activity and the 
benefits that some derive from a system of categorical inequality create interests that advantaged 
groups aim to protect.” Based on the passage, however, the nature of these advantaged groups is 
ambiguous; do they constitute a ruling elite, or are they simply one among many interest groups? 
 In the specific cases of Malaysia and South Africa, historical evidence appears to lean 
toward the interest group explanation, best articulated by Block (1987). Arguing from a Marxist 
perspective, he writes:  
 
…capitalist rationality emerges out of the three-sided relationship among 
capitalists, workers, and state managers. The structural position of state managers 
forces them to achieve some consciousness of what is necessary to maintain the 
viability of the social order … [however] the fact of consciousness does not imply 
control over the historical process (Block 1987: 67). 
 
Larson and Zalanga claim in their analysis that contradictory class positions, as articulated by 
Block and others, do not “provide adequate insight in ethnically-divided societies” (2003: 77) 
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because by focusing solely on class structures, one fails to consider the influence of a competing 
ethnic-based hierarchy. They state that “multiple axes of identity – class and ethnicity – may be 
used to attempt to mobilize popular support for policies of ethnic redistribution” (Larson and 
Zalanga 2003: 77). Revisiting Adam’s definition of affirmative action, one can easily see how 
ethnic redistribution can be easily framed as a viable remedial strategy; after all, in all cases of 
historical legal exclusion – South Africa and Malaysia being no exception – legal exclusion has 
invariably been linked with economic exclusion. In their study, Larson and Zalanga claim that 
the beneficiaries of favorable state policies “successfully pursued [them] based on class interest, 
but mobilized support using rhetoric of indigenous identity” (2003: 77). Calhoun (2007) reminds 
us that ethnic groups are the creation of elites seeking to protect themselves and/or gain 
political/economic advantages. Although it is beyond the historical scope of this paper, the same 
can be said of both South Africa and Malaysia. Critics of affirmative action policies claim that 
these favorable policies are examples of cronyism, where “[t]he government transferred wealth 
to a small pool of politically well-connected businessmen” (Fuller 2001) and effectively 
excluding the majority of the ‘favored’ ethnic group from enjoying the benefits. 
Thus far, we have examined theories which deal with the effects colonial strategies had 
on societal structures and divides. This, however, is not a unidirectional influence. Edward Said 
(1978) and others observed that, rather than rejecting the colonially-imposed – and therefore 
alien – identities, members of these identities instead internalize them by forming groups which 
advocate for and influence policies reinforcing these colonial identities (Larson and Zalanga 
2003). 
Effects of Colonial Strategies on State Policy 
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 Because the influence if colonial strategies is not unidirectional, the resulting societal 
divides and identities end up being self-reinforcing. This is reflected in differences in policy 
outcomes, such as affirmative action (Dobbin 1994, Skocpol 1985). The application of Dobbin’s 
framework to our cases suggest that the problems associated with inequality were both perceived 
as different sorts of problems requiring different solutions in the two countries. In the cases of 
South Africa and Malaysia, relations between the post-colonial politically-dominant group, the 
state, and the British (the common colonial elite) is a core component in understanding why 
affirmative action policies in South Africa and Malaysia diverged so sharply given their similar 
historical backgrounds. 
 One policy that bears a closer examination, as it is closely related with affirmative action, 
is that of citizenship. More specifically, the central question pertaining to citizenship is 
seemingly simple: if we consider affirmative action to be an undeniable and fundamental right of 
a privileged group of citizens of a nation, who is eligible for this citizenship right? More 
specifically, who is deserving of state assistance (such as affirmative action)? Why are certain 
groups denied state assistance, and what can they do to attain it? Because the dominant minority 
groups in both South Africa and Malaysia are foreign in origin, the logical follow-up question is: 
are immigrant groups eligible for citizenship, and if so, what are the criteria for citizenship? In 
addition, are citizenship rights universal for everyone, and if not, how are they divided? In other 
words, who deserves state assistance? 
Citizenship as State Policy 
Central to any discussion on citizenship is the concept of assimilation; 
 
Assimilation ... is incompatible with all consistently "organic" conceptions of 
membership, according to which “natural” ethnolinguistic boundaries are prior to 
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and determinative of national and (ideally) state boundaries … [A]ssimilation 
presupposes a political conception of membership and the belief … that the state 
can turn strangers into citizens (Brubaker 1998: 143). 
 
 According to Brubaker (1998), the issue of citizenship for immigrants falls somewhere in 
between two extremes. On one extreme, which Brubaker classifies as “traditional countries of 
immigration,” citizenship is unconditionally granted to all people born in the country. On the 
other extreme, citizenship is ethnically-based – meaning that immigrants, no matter how long 
their ties are to the country, can never be considered full citizens. In the cases of South Africa 
and Malaysia, there are two different ways one can interpret this statement. Because the political 
elite in Malaysia were primarily made up of ethnic Malays, given their history of legal exclusion 
from institutions of economic power, they had an interest after gaining independence in 
sustaining ethnicity-based citizenship policies which classified other ethnic groups as immigrants, 
regardless of their historical attachments to the country. On the other hand, because the 
Afrikaners of South Africa were a non-indigenous minority group, they had an interest in 
promoting assimilationist citizenship policies when their post-independence policy of apartheid 
ended. 
 Organizing the political and economic life of a colony along ethnic lines is not something 
unique to the two cases being considered in this paper. Many other colonial powers have indeed 
relied on racialized social orders, which divided the colonial population into distinct categories 
of citizens and subjects (Mamdani 1996, Larson and Aminzade forthcoming, Larson and Zalanga 
2003) as a strategy to avoid challenges to their authority. Part of the British colonizers’ “grand 
strategy,” which was seen in colonies throughout their empire, was the assignment of specific 
roles for specific groups. 
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 As colonies of empires gained their independence, part of the exercise of self-
determination involved answering questions of who should have citizenship rights. Common 
bases for citizenship exclusion include religion and race (Larson and Aminzade forthcoming). In 
states with racially-divided histories, such as Malaysia and South Africa, the non-indigenous 
origins of the economically-dominant group allowed for the potential of indigenous groups to 
portray them as foreign, and therefore inassimilable. In essence, debates on citizenship policy 
center on two very closely-related questions: “whom the state really is supposed to represent and 
which groups are legitimately resident in the country and merit membership in the nation-state 
and citizenship rights” (Larson and Aminzade forthcoming: 5-6).  
 Citizenship rights are extremely important for several reasons. They determine, for 
instance, who gets the right to political representation (Mamdani 2001, Brysk and Shafir 2004), 
the right to enjoy social welfare provisions (Kale-Lostuvali 2007), and the right to legal 
protection from a state’s coercive mechanisms (Einolf 2007). Anything less should be considered 
a status that is less-than-full citizenship. 
 There is one important point that should be noted about citizenship. According to Gellner 
(2000), “[p]eople seem willing to accept and internalize any degree of inequality, however 
extreme, provided it is stable, complex, and habitual” (282). Essentially, inequality on its own 
does not stoke tensions between, in the cases of Malaysia and South Africa, different ethnic 
groups. However, it is when this stability is disrupted, regardless of whether inequalities are 
ameliorated or worsened, that racial tensions can be expected to rise. This claim should be kept 
in mind as we examine how the history and legacy of race relations affected affirmative action 
policies. 
 
Methods 
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 What was responsible for Malaysia’s peaceful racial coexistence and South Africa’s 
violent repression of their various ethnic groups, and how did this affect the affirmative action 
policies that both countries eventually adopted? Given the theoretical framework provided in the 
previous section on state and identity formation, I believe the research question can be focused 
further: how do we understand the difference in the different rationales for affirmative action 
policies given the two cases’ different transitions to independence? The link between this 
question and the theoretical overview may not be readily apparent. I am essentially assuming that 
different rationales for affirmative action emerged from two unique societies (and their 
respective societal divides), which owed their existence to the different strategies which were 
imposed upon them during colonial rule. As mentioned in the introduction, there are two possible 
outcomes to consider: affirmative action policies with retributive rationales, as was observed in 
Malaysia; and affirmative action policies with restitutive rationales, as was the case in South 
Africa. I have chosen to examine both countries’ history of colonial rule; and more specifically, 
their respective transitions to independence. This was based on my interpretation that 
independence represents the convergence of the two related main theoretical frameworks which I 
had outlined above (colonial strategies symbolizing the ideas and policies of the colonial era, 
which had a significant influence on state policy symbolizing the ideas and policies of the post-
colonial state, of which citizenship is but one aspect). 
 This comparative and historical analysis will be organized in two sections. The first 
section – history of colonial rule – seeks to define and contextualize the reasons behind 
Malaysia’s relatively peaceful transition to independence, in contrast to South Africa’s violent 
struggle for independence. The second section – ethnic relations in the post-colonial state – seeks 
to examine some of the key historical processes which I have deemed to have had the most 
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influence on the two observed outcomes. These processes include: the basis of franchise, the 
distribution of economic opportunities, the prevalent perception of the economically-dominant 
group, the role of international pressure, and present-day political organization.  
Data Analysis 
History of Colonial Rule 
 Although both Malaysia and South Africa share a common colonial master, the situation 
that their British colonizers faced when they first arrived was extremely different. In line with 
Julian Go’s concept of “provinciality,” the policies the British ended up adopting also turned out 
to be extremely different. 
 Mamdani (2001: 10) writes, “It is more or less a rule of thumb that the more Western 
settlement a colony experienced, the greater was the violence unleashed against the native 
population. The reason was simple: settler colonization led to land deprivation.” This was 
definitely the case in South Africa, where there were numerous existing Afrikaner settlements 
when the British seized control from the Dutch in 1806 (CIA 2008b). Because of their isolation 
from the urban centers where political power was concentrated, the British takeover of South 
Africa did not initially have a great effect on the Afrikaner settlers, as they felt no strong 
allegiance toward central authority. To begin with, the Afrikaners did not have much in common 
with their new political leaders. Not only did they speak a different language, they also differed 
culturally and religiously: the Afrikaners identified themselves as white, Afrikaans-speaking 
Calvinists who were racially superior to the indigenous peoples they encountered (Dubow 1992, 
Giliomee 2003, Lovell 1956, Tummala 1999).  
Being rural frontiersmen, the Afrikaners had numerous clashes with natives as they 
expanded further into the interior over issues pertaining to ownership of land. In addition, since 
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slavery was legal at the time, the Afrikaners relied heavily on the indigenous peoples – 
particularly the Khoisan – as an inexpensive supply of labor. Although the Afrikaners were 
already facing pressure from their clashes with indigenous peoples on the frontier, the British 
colonizers further strained their relations with the settlers by implementing policies that the 
Afrikaners perceived as threatening: 
 
When that authority [the British] did not support [their frontier culture], they were 
disappointed. When it went further in challenging their values in the late 
eighteenth century by cautiously nibbling at theoretical black-white equality, 
including mild approval of mission institutions, or land reserves, for Hottentots 
[in more neutral terms, the Khoisan], they were outraged at government for 
endangering both their group identity and their labor supply (Lovell 1956: 310). 
 
Specific examples of such measures include the Nineteenth Ordinance (1826) which 
permitted slaves to testify against their masters in criminal cases, and the Fifteenth Ordinance 
(1828) which declared that “all free persons, regardless of color, had equal rights, including 
landholding,” essentially the antithesis of Afrikaner values (Lovell 1956: 311-2). Another 
example of colonial policy coming into conflict with Afrikaner values was the British push to 
free slave labor and to bring these former slaves under wage labor. These ideological clashes 
were eventually transformed into a full-fledged Afrikaner nationalist movement, culminating in 
armed and violent clashes such as the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 (Lovell 1956, Sakarai 1976). 
This history of violent struggle became a defining characteristic of South Africa’s transition to 
independence in 1910 (CIA 2008b). 
In contrast, there was negligible resistance to the British takeover in Malaysia. First of all, 
unlike South Africa, there were no European settlements in Malaysia when the British first 
arrived during the late 18th century (CIA 2008a); nor did the British attempt to establish any. As 
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a result, the British did not attempt to blatantly interfere with pre-existing power structures in the 
territory. More specifically, the British “allow[ed] the sultans to retain the trappings – but only 
the trappings – of authority, and … encouraged the rest of the Malay population to continue its 
traditional activities,” that of subsistence farming (Wyzan 1990: 50-1). Consequently, physical 
labor for Malaysia’s British-run rubber plantations and tin mines was almost entirely dependent 
on immigrant groups such as the Chinese and the Indians (Sowell 2004). 
By mandating that the indigenous peoples remain subsistence farmers and fishermen, the 
Malays did not participate in and become competitors for British interests – namely, plantation 
agriculture and tin mining (Wyzan 1990). At the same time, the British tacitly approved the 
existence of a burgeoning Chinese merchant class (Larson and Zalanga 2003, Sowell 2004, 
Wyzan 1990), as it for most part did not compete with the main British economic interest of tin 
mining and processing. It is noteworthy that the British did provide Malays with some 
preferential treatment under the rationale of trusteeship and tutelage, privileges which were 
enjoyed largely by a small, select group hailing from elite families (Wyzan 1990). This included 
education preparing them for careers in the civil service via positions that had been explicitly 
earmarked for Malays (Larson and Zalanga 2003, Sowell 2004, Wyzan 1990). This resulted in 
some levels of political power being shared between the British and Malays on the lower levels 
of the bureaucracy; overall, however, the British made sure to maintain the upper hand. 
It is important to note that the British nor any of its subject populations attempted to 
blatantly push for the exclusion or expulsion of any other group in the same manner as South 
Africa – largely because these different populations voluntarily kept themselves apart: they 
worked in different industries, lived in segregated neighborhoods, and had different power 
bases – rural areas for Malays; urban areas for the Chinese (Sowell 2004). 
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As a result, Malaysia’s transition to independence was relatively peaceful. Because 
Malaysian independence in 1957 did not come as a result of an armed struggle, the British were 
able to retain significant influence over the transition itself and place conditions on the newly-
independent country. The most significant conditions included: the formation of a broadly-based 
pro-Britain government capable of holding together a culturally heterogeneous Malaysian society, 
guarantees of Malaysian political supremacy, guaranteed protection of Chinese capitalist 
interests, and the liberalization of citizenship requirements (Larson and Zalanga 2003: 78). 
Ethnic Relations 
 Basis of Franchise. Due to the different transitions to independence that both states 
experienced, both states experienced very different legacies of ethnic relations. To begin with, 
bases of franchise established were extremely different. Because of the peaceful nature of the 
Malaysian transition, the United Kingdom was able to influence not only the creation of a fully 
democratic government, but also its preliminary framework for citizenship. In essence, everyone 
who was a legally-recognized citizen of Malaysia was eligible for political participation. Even 
though the British had guaranteed the indigenous Malays political supremacy, British guarantees 
to the other ethnic groups enabled them to mobilize politically. Because Malaysian society was, 
from the very beginning, split along racial and ethnic lines, three dominant political parties 
emerged, each representing one of the major ethnic groups: the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC) (Larson and Zalanga 2003, Sowell 2004). In part owing to the ethnic proportion 
of Malaysian society, the dominant party has long been the UMNO, with the MCA as their 
primary coalition partner to this present day. This ethnic divide in political participation is far 
more pronounced among the chief opposition parties, such as the Chinese Democratic Action 
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Party (DAP) and the Malay Partai Islam (PAS), a fundamentalist group. These parties have 
“generally taken more forceful stands in favor of their ethnic constituencies” (Wyzan 1990: 53).  
 There is an interesting side note to Malaysia’s political situation. Prior to independence, 
the continuing flow of Chinese immigrants into the country meant that, at one point, the 
indigenous Malays were a demographic minority in their own country. For instance, in 1948, 
Malaysia’s population was 45% Chinese, 43% Malay, and 10% Indian (Mills 1964). An eventual 
slowdown in Chinese immigration, coupled with Malays’ higher fertility rates, restored the 
indigenous Malays’ majority. However, upon independence, Malaysia’s population was still 
fairly evenly split between indigenous and non-indigenous groups (Larson and Zalanga 2003). In 
1965, in a bid to strengthen their political situation, the Malay government took the 
unprecedented decision to expel Singapore, a city with an extremely large Chinese population, 
from the Malaysian state (Sowell 2004). The expulsion of Singapore left the indigenous Malays 
firmly in political control in Malaysia. 
 In contrast, South Africa established a far from democratic government upon 
independence. Although the British had granted indigenous natives the right to vote prior to 
independence, Afrikaner nationalists took advantage of the low voter turnout rates of the 
indigenous natives by introducing new measures designed to lessen their political impact. For 
example, in 1931, the Statute of Westminster was approved and enacted; an important issue 
which the statute legalized was the enfranchisement of all European women and the small 
population of disenfranchised European men (Lovell 1956:  324-5). Although the natives had 
been politically weak since before independence, this measure essentially stripped them of their 
franchise. As history shows us, the natives (classified as Blacks) were excluded from economic 
and political participation until the landmark elections of 1994. 
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 The Distribution of Economic Opportunities. This historical process is one where the 
effects of the colonial strategy employed by the British colonizers proved to be enduring. As 
previously mentioned, while under colonial rule, the various ethnic groups in Malaysia were 
assigned to non-competing roles. However, after independence, Malaysian society remained 
voluntarily segregated. The heart of the issue is not difficult to determine: after all, the different 
ethnic groups spoke different languages, adhered to different religions, and basically had 
different lifestyles (Sowell 2004: 57). During colonial rule, the British colonizers were able to 
find common ground by using English as the primary language in government and in schools. 
 Although different ethnically-based political parties were founded during independence, 
these parties were initially organized around an inclusive coalition known as the Alliance Party 
(Jomo 1990, Larson and Zalanga 2003). Central to the Alliance were goals seeking to increase 
indigenous Malay representation in business and the promotion of joint business investment 
between the Chinese and Malays (Larson and Zalanga 2003: 79). Not surprisingly, sections of 
the growing Malay elite were unhappy with the Alliance’s policies, and they made their views 
known in the May 1969 elections which sparked the race riots. According to Jomo (1990), the 
results of the elections were an indication of three related developments: 
 
(1) growing disillusion among the Malaysian public with the Alliance 
government’s policies, especially in the economic and cultural spheres; (2) 
rejection among the growing Malay middle class of the Tunku’s [Tunku Abdul 
Rahman was the Malaysian head of state] accommodative policy to Chinese and 
foreign capital; and (3) the electoral rejection of the Alliance, especially in 
Peninsular Malaysia, in favour of an ethnically divided opposition (471). 
 
The election results were also noteworthy because of the proportion of people who voted against 
the Alliance. Based on the Alliance Party’s goals, one would be tempted to conclude that 
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members of non-indigenous ethnic groups would be strongly in favor of the party and the 
policies they were promising to implement. This was not the case, however: according to 
estimates, “about half the Malays voted against the Alliance together with about two-thirds of 
non-Malays” (Jomo 1990: 470). 
 Indigenous Malay interest in the economic sector can be attributed to a basic supply-and-
demand model. As mentioned previously, Britain’s colonial legacy designated education and 
government as the near-exclusive domains of the indigenous Malays. Specific examples of such 
colonial policies include the guarantee of free education and the earmarking of jobs within the 
colonial bureaucracy for ethnic Malays (Sowell 2004, Wyzan 1990). Upon independence, the 
rapidly-growing Malaysian university-trained middle class were initially absorbed into the 
government, which had been guaranteed by the British to be the near-exclusive domain of the 
indigenous peoples. However, since there were only a finite number of available positions in the 
government bureaucracy, the members of the middle class shifted its focus to the economic 
realm (Jomo 1990), pushing their government for policies that would favor their entry into 
business while inhibiting perceived sources of competition (namely, the Chinese and foreign 
investors). Larson and Zalanga’s claim that beneficiaries of state policies favoring class interests 
justify their interests using indigenous identity is confirmed by Jomo, who states that those 
responsible for drafting the NEP were aware, to some extent, that “[t]he growing ethnic divide 
had a class texture” (Jomo 1990: 471). 
 The situation in South Africa is, in comparison, far less complicated. Under apartheid, 
discrimination in employment (among other fields) was institutionalized in laws such as the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956. Prior to 1979, access to skilled work was virtually 
monopolized by white trade unions, who essentially served as gatekeepers restricting the access 
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of blacks to apprenticeships required for skilled work. Although most of these laws were found 
to constitute unfair labor practices and legally abolished in 1979, de facto racial discrimination in 
employment still persisted (Horwitz, Bowmaker-Falconer, and Searll 1995). 
 Like the British in Malaysia, the Afrikaners sought to assign the various ethnic groups in 
South Africa to clearly-defined roles. General Hertzog, an Afrikaner nationalist during the 1930s 
and 1940s, believed that since both groups had the right to self-determination in South Africa 
there had to be a balance of power in South Africa, as the realization of self-determination for 
one group would invariably infringe on the claims of the other. Therefore, because blacks had 
numerical superiority, the minority Afrikaners were entitled to political, economic, and military 
superiority. Furthermore, he also believed that this ‘stale-mate’ could only be resolved either 
through war (in other words, ‘ploughing under’ the other group) or ‘separate development,’ his 
idea of a peaceful solution (Giliomee 2003: 386-7). 
 Horwitz et al. (1995: 683) confirms that General Hertzog’s views were indeed influential 
in the apartheid-era South African state: “Until 1994, the fragmented nature of South African 
society offered few unifying symbols. Systems were designed to keep people apart, and more 
emphasis has been put on differences rather than those aspects on which to build a common 
testing.” 
 At this point of the comparison, both South Africa and Malaysia had converged on very 
similar and exclusionary policies, despite whatever differences they may have had during their 
respective transitions to independence. These similar policies seem to share a common root: a 
rebellion against the colonial legacy that their British colonizers tried to implement shortly 
before or during the nations’ respective transitions to independence. In Malaysia’s case, the 
introduction and implementation of preferential policies for indigenous Malays ran directly 
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counter to British guarantees of protection for Chinese capitalist interests. In the case of South 
Africa, apartheid was effectively a reversal of British attempts to reform race relations between 
the Afrikaners and indigenous peoples. In addition, the ideas employed to justify both 
preferential policies for Malays and apartheid are somewhat similar – that both groups had an 
inherent right to their social positions. The wording of these rationales appears to suggest that 
their authors expected them to be open-ended, infinite, and lasting.  Given this claim, what is 
responsible for South Africa’s dramatic reversal of their existing ethnic policies in the early 
1990s? In addition, why has Malaysia not experienced a similar turnaround in their pre-NEP 
ethnic policies? 
 The Role of International Pressure on Domestic Policies. Any discussion about the 
transformation of domestic policies would be incomplete if we disregarded the effects of 
international pressure, particularly since the two cases being examined here implemented their 
respective affirmative action policies in the latter half of the twentieth century. It is during this 
time that improvements in methods of communication and the rising popularity of global 
discourses such as human rights, coupled with the post-World War II order that was constructed 
(most notably, the United Nations) that gave the international stage the prominence and 
legitimacy to function as a source of pressure on domestic policies.  
 International organizations such as the United Nations took the lead in providing 
increasingly hostile positions against apartheid – a notable example of this was a “post-war series 
of UNESCO-sponsored pamphlets in which top scientific authorities were afforded the 
opportunity to destroy prevailing racial myths” (Dubow 1992: 231). In addition, the international 
anti-apartheid struggle waged an ideological campaign which linked apartheid to Nazi policies of 
racial purity, and by extension, portrayed apartheid as a crime against humanity (Dubow 1992, 
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Giliomee 2003). While it is true that the Afrikaners initially employed pro-Fascist ideologies 
formulated during their struggle for independence from Great Britain, their sensitivity to 
international pressure forced them to find other ways of alleviating the criticisms being leveled at 
them. This, according to Dubow (1992: 201), led “to a coyness about the use of explicit racist 
formulations and a withdrawal from the pro-Fascist sentiment which was evident during the 
war.” More specifically, “one of the favored responses [to this onslaught of international 
criticism] was the disavowal of any connexion between apartheid and notions of innate racial 
superiority” (Dubow 1992: 235). Eventually, continuing international pressure predominantly 
based on the themes of human rights would lead to the downfall of apartheid and the reversal of 
laws and policies that have long excluded the indigenous natives from mechanism of political 
and economic power. 
 In contrast, the Malays in Malaysia did not face the same difficulties affecting the 
Afrikaners in South Africa. For one, there was never any ambiguity about the Malays’ claims as 
an indigenous people; in fact, part of the British colonizers’ grand strategy was to institutionalize 
the role of the state as the protector of the indigenous peoples (Kale-Lostuvali 2007, Larson and 
Aminzade forthcoming, Wyzan 1990). More specifically: 
 
It was official British policy to preserve the use of the indigenous forms and 
institutions of the Malays, and to be solicitous of their views, in keeping with the 
philosophy that colonial rule was a form of trusteeship for the Malays, with the 
British acting as “umpire” mainly to keep the alien Chinese at bay (Comber 1983: 
11). 
 
When the indigenous Malays assumed political power, they inherited state mechanisms from 
their former colonial masters, along with the idea of the state as the defender of indigenous rights. 
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 Having the banner of indigenous rights behind them allowed the Malays to adopt several 
measures without attracting the criticism of the international community. There is one key factor 
that contributes toward this that was not available to the Afrikaners of South Africa: namely, 
although the Malays had political power, they lagged far behind the Chinese in terms of 
economic power. Hence: 
 
 [b]y grounding claims in the status of indigeneity, advocates of race-based 
policies of redress based their arguments either on entitlement to resources 
distributed by the state or the need for state policies designed to redistribute 
wealth and income by limiting ownership and property rights for non-indigenous 
citizens (Larson and Aminzade forthcoming: 7). 
 
The Malays were able to use this rationale to justify their policies of ethnically-preferential 
policies, particularly those pertaining to ethnic redistribution. In line with international 
discourses of civil and human rights, the Malaysian government acknowledges that some of their 
preferential policies run counter to international norms (Jomo 1990). However, the official view 
of the Malaysian government according to Jomo (1990: 490) is that “civil liberties and 
democratic rights have to be sacrificed in the interest of export growth.” Although the Malaysian 
government has framed their reasons for these preferential policies along the lines of 
“eliminat[ing] the identification of race with economic function” (Jomo 1990: 474), Jomo warns 
that this ideology is ultimately dishonest and self-serving, biased toward the interests of the 
ruling elite. 
Present Views of the Dominant Group. Because Malaysia did not experience 
international criticism over their preferential policies, the present-day views of the economically-
dominant group have not changed since colonial times. Present views of the dominant group is 
an important consideration while analyzing the historical origins of these cases’ affirmative 
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action policies, because it sheds some insight into why Malaysia’s ethnically-preferential policies 
have not changed since the 1960s – and still persists so strongly today, while South Africa 
experienced an almost-complete reversal of apartheid. Although Malays at present have already 
enjoyed some benefits from the preferential policies of the NEP, this continues to be an 
important issue, especially since the NEP was originally designed to have a finite start and end 
date: 1971 – 1990 (Jomo 1990). At this point, the rationale for the NEP is still very much a valid 
and important point, particularly because there is much pressure for the Malaysian government to 
extend the affirmative action policies under the NEP past 1990 (Jomo 1990: 469). 
 Because the indigenous Malays still have relatively-uncontested claims to political 
power, the other ethnic groups are still considered to this day to be immigrants – and as such, 
less-than-full citizens. Although there are some who claim that these preferential policies have, 
in part, drastically reduced the incidences of “serious ethnic clashes” in Malaysia (Fuller 2001), 
others have claimed that interethnic tensions have actually worsened (Jomo 1990: 492). This is 
the essence of Malaysia’s rationale for implementing and sustaining retributive affirmative 
action policies: colonial identities established during British rule have persisted to this day 
primarily due to the lack of external pressures mandating for change.  
In contrast, South African policies have changed dramatically since their experience with 
colonialism. Precisely because the Afrikaners lost their bid for legitimacy for their claims of self-
determination on the international stage, they have had to find new ways of integrating 
themselves into a society in which they are an undisputed minority. 
The solution the Afrikaners stumbled upon was that of economic cooperation. During the 
early 1990s, business managers realized that apartheid policies had left South Africa with a 
severely underdeveloped human capital resource base. Compared to many other nations, the 
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legacy forged by apartheid included a high unemployment and low literacy rates. The presence 
of a growing unskilled labor pool coupled along with high unemployment rates contributed to 
low economic growth, in addition to poor labor and capital productivity. Employers began 
addressing these economic shortcomings, employing the context of a growing global movement 
toward multiculturalism (Adam 1997, Horwitz et al. 1995). Other efforts at building national 
unity included enshrining the bases of affirmative action policies in the Constitution in inclusive 
terms. More specifically, the Constitution pledges to “recognize the injustices of our past,” states 
that the country belongs “to all who live in it, united in our diversity,” and promises to “heal the 
divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights” (Tummala 1999: 499). 
 
Conclusion 
 Despite their many similarities, Malaysia’s and South Africa’s differences in affirmative 
action policies can be traced back to the circumstances surrounding each country’s respective 
transition to independence, as this transition to independence essentially set in motion the 
historical processes responsible for the two nations’ different policies. Although both countries 
were former colonies of Great Britain, the British left two very different legacies of ethnic 
relations behind, legacies which persisted long beyond the act of independence itself. In 
Malaysia, political power was handed to the majority ethnicity – the indigenous Malays – 
whereas in South Africa, control of the political and economic spheres was forcibly seized by the 
non-indigenous Afrikaners. These distinctions led to several notable differences between the two 
states. South Africa ended up being ruled by an ethnic minority; consequently, this meant that 
they had to resort to coercive (and non-democratic) means to hold on to their advantaged 
position in South African society. Being unable to obtain legitimacy from the international 
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community for their claims to indigeneity, and therefore to self-determination, the Afrikaners 
were extremely susceptible to international pressure. This eventually led to the downfall of 
apartheid and resulted in the Afrikaners’ search for other unifying symbols, such as economic 
success and multiculturalism, to justify their continued existence in South Africa. In contrast, 
although the British implemented a fully democratic government in Malaysia before they left, 
several colonial legacies of the British colonizers exacerbated ethnic tensions and made it very 
difficult to forge a national unity among the various ethnicities. Because political power for the 
Malays were guaranteed by the British, along with their being a demographic majority, the 
Malays were able to use the post-election riots of 1969 as an excuse to implement economic 
policies which favored Malays and directly targeted the Chinese. By framing their claims in the 
discourse of indigenous rights, the Malays were able to avoid criticism from international actors 
such as other states and the United Nations. That the Chinese have continued to do well 
economically despite the Malaysian government’s unfavorable policies have provided the 
political Malay elite with a reason to continue current policies of economic redistribution.  
 From the claims and data presented in this paper, there are many possibilities for further 
research. At several instances, I have cited notable points that were beyond the scope of this 
paper. One of them is a more focused and elaborate analysis into whether these affirmative 
action policies have actually aided their intended beneficiaries, and if so, then by how much. 
More specifically, it would be interesting to investigate whether the differing natures of the two 
countries’ policies had any effect on how successful the policies were at meeting their aim of 
economic redistribution. This may, of course, be difficult to determine in the case of South 
Africa, given how recently their affirmative action policies were actually implemented. It could 
very well turn out that we will not be able to draw any definite conclusions about the 
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effectiveness of the Employment Equity Act. Another narrower topic for further research would 
be an examination into how and why the Chinese in Malaysia were able to increase their share of 
the Malaysian economy despite of all the policies that have been placed against them. For a more 
theoretical focus, one could examine how the Chinese in Malaysia attempted to remedy or 
alleviate the effects of the discriminatory policies they were faced with, as this is something that 
did not come up in the various sources cited by this study. What mechanisms of redress did the 
Chinese seek to employ? Did they attempt to mobilize international discourses (for example, 
human rights, multiculturalism, etc.), and if so, why were they not successful? The answers to 
the potential research questions posed above would not only enrich the analysis of historical 
papers such as this one, but it would also contribute to a better understanding of affirmative 
action policies itself: whose interests it serves, who it helps, and what dangers it faces to 
achieving its noble (or ignoble, depending on intent) goal of alleviating the inequalities apparent 
in many societies in the world. 
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